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Refining Explosive 
Safety Outreach
by Geoff Carton [ CALIBRE Systems, Inc. ] and  
Laura Grindstaff [ Bristol Site Contractors, LLC ]
E xplosives safety awareness programs must identify the target audience and communicate easily under-stood concepts. To be effective, an audience must ap-
ply the concepts presented; however, this is not enough. The 
program and its message must also be adaptable to a variety of 
audiences based on how they assimilate information. The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) has at least 100 years of safety 
education experience. Over this time, explosives safety mes-
sages underwent several evolutions.
Early DoD efforts focused on munitions that soldiers 
brought home as war trophies and that souvenir hunters re-
covered from military sites. News articles post-World War I 
and II discouraged people from collecting munitions by us-
ing graphic descriptions of explosive safety risks involved in 
handling munitions. The target audience post-World War II 
broadened to incorporate communities near military instal-
lations, including installations that were used for war-time 
training but had returned to public use. News articles post-
World War II describe an intensive DoD program to remove 
munitions from lands once used for live-fire training and 
testing. They also informed the public of hazards associated 
with collecting scrap metal and souvenirs from these areas. 
The effectiveness of the munitions removal effort was lim-
ited by the then-current technology and at many sites only a 
surface clearance was completed.
Despite DoD efforts to communicate explosives safety mes-
sages, injuries to soldiers and civilians of every age continued. 
DoD began to examine the further cleanup of munitions sites 
circa 1983 after a detonation killed two children playing with 
a munition they encountered near their home. When DoD’s 
Defense Environmental Restoration Program was established 
in 1986, its main goal was preventing hazardous chemical 
contamination, but efforts to detect and dispose of unexplod-
ed ordnance, which endangers soldiers and civilians alike, be-
came more organized. Munitions kept as souvenirs, collected 
for their historical value, or simply disturbed by human con-
tact on military ranges have also injured or killed a number of 
adults. These incidents and differing audiences led DoD to de-
velop a variety of safety materials based on the program and 
funding rather than consistent message.
In 2000, an explosive 
incident that involved 
trespassing on an active 
range and the removal of 
munitions killed one teenager and injured another. This led 
the U.S. Army to review DoD explosives safety messages and 
programs. The review found that DoD military services had 
different messages. Some focused on soldiers, while others 
focused on the public or specific risks (e.g., former ranges, 
souvenirs). While well intentioned, the differing materials di-
luted their effectiveness. This led the Army to develop a core 
message: the 3Rs (Recognize, Retreat, Report) that focus-
es on dangers munitions pose and encourages safe behavior 
should a munition or suspect munition be encountered. The 
objective was to create a safety message simple enough to be 
understood by all ages but broad enough to address a variety 
of audiences (e.g., souvenir collectors, construction workers) 
and activities (e.g., outdoor recreation, divers).
With input from focus groups that included risk communi-
cators, explosives safety professionals, parents, and educators, 
the Army crafted the 3Rs as its core explosives safety message. 
The Army developed educational materials including safety 
guides, briefings, signs, and explosives safety presentations 
around this core message. The goals of the 3Rs Explosives 
Safety Education Program are to:
* Provide a simple, consistent, and easily remembered 
message;
* Eliminate redundant efforts and contradictory messages; 
and
* Develop 3Rs Program educational material to be  
* General enough to apply to a variety of audiences and 
activities; or
* Tailored to specific audiences (e.g., children), activities 
(e.g., fishing, construction), or communities (e.g., ci-
vilians, military families).
After 2000, the 3Rs Program became DoD’s basis for in-
forming the public of dangers associated with encountering 
munitions and avoiding injury. A 2011 study of munitions-
related incidents on properties no longer under DoD control 
determined that munitions were intentionally disturbed in at 
The 3Rs.mil home page. A variety of materials 
and activities for differing audiences are avail-
able from the website.
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least 20 of the 24 incidents and exposed on the surface in ev-
ery case. In addition, the majority of the individuals injured 
or killed were male. As a result, the Army increased the fo-
cus of its 3Rs Program for at-risk populations (e.g., children, 
particularly boys because over half of the fatalities were chil-
dren and 90 percent of the children were boys) and behaviors 
(e.g., moving or disturbing munitions). The Army then initi-
ated an independent assessment to evaluate the effectiveness 
of 3Rs Program materials. Rather than employing a tradition-
al questionnaire or survey, the assessment consisted of nearly 
100 one-on-one dialogues with children ages 9–12 at schools 
near former military installations that represented a variety of 
communities and cultures.
The assessment indicated that participants exhibited an 
understanding that munitions were dangerous, and civilians 
should not move or disturb them. However, it also identified 
knowledge gaps and unintended responses for important de-
tails of the 3Rs message. Some of the knowledge gaps indicated 
student confusion regarding the use of different terms and ex-
planations for munitions-related concepts. Presentations in-
troduced munitions-related vocabulary that students needed 
to learn to fully understand the core message. The assessment 
indicated that most students could not understand every con-
cept presented during a one-time presentation. Additionally, 
the result was a muddled understanding of how dangerous 
munitions could be and confusion about the meanings of re-
treat and report.
The evaluation indicated that some of the 3Rs methods 
used to communicate its message (e.g., classroom, printed 
media) were more effective for certain audiences. An individ-
ual visiting an area where munitions are present could benefit 
from receiving a pamphlet about the potential hazard and ap-
propriate safety behaviors, while people living and working 
in communities near sites with munitions benefit most by at-
tending a 3Rs presentation where they can ask questions. In 
military families, children are likely to complete 3Rs coloring 
books with their parents, benefiting the entire family. Finally, 
soldiers who already understand the dangers associated with 
munitions may be more effectively influenced by public ser-
vice announcements focusing on their professional respon-
sibilities and the potential danger that munitions present to 
their families.
Refinements the Army made to the 3Rs Program since 
2011 have focused on recognizing the dangers associated with 
munitions over understanding munitions-related concepts. 
These refinements also better emphasize safe behaviors over 
other responses (e.g., curiosity) or reactions (e.g., the desire 
to identify the item, the instinct to pick up an item) when a 
munition or suspect munition is encountered. The Army’s 
message evolved to be more uniform:
* Recognize when you may have encountered a munition 
and that munitions are dangerous.
* Retreat, do not approach, touch, move or disturb it, but 
carefully leave the area.
* Report the munition to local law enforcement and advise 
them of what you saw and where you saw it.
In 2015, the Army redesigned its 3Rs Program website 
(http://3Rs.mil) making it easier to use, accessible to mo-
bile devices, and better at conveying the danger associated 
with munitions and safe behaviors for given audiences (e.g., 
children, teens, adults).1 A variety of 3Rs Program materi-
als including files for printing, videos, and presentations are 
available from the redesigned 3Rs website. Its new design al-
lows for easier navigation to content appropriate for a variety 
of groups: children and families, military and their families, 
community, and workers. 
The Army’s 3Rs Program is now generally accepted as 
DoD’s 3Rs Program. To remain effective, DoD 3Rs Program 
must continue to evolve and adapt. 
See endnotes page 66
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